Respect for religion

Widespread protests have resulted from an amateur, anti-Islamic video, initially posted on a video-sharing website, and among the many responses and condemnations of the film and the following violence have been those made by the Council of Europe and the EU.

Acknowledging that the video was prejudiced and offensive, the Council of Europe issued a strong and unequivocal condemnation of what it described as well-orchestrated violence, and exhorted political and religious leaders to do their utmost to prevent further incidents.  Given its position as the ‘guardian of the European Convention on Human Rights’, the Secretary General’s statement focused on freedom of expression, and highlighted:

  • The need to do more to explain the scope and importance of the freedom of expression;
  • Ensuring that the freedom of expression is implemented without any double standards, regardless of the context and specific cultural aspect;
  • An increased need to fight intolerance, hate-speech and prejudice, including anti-Islamism in our societies.

By contrast, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, together with the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the Secretary General of the Arab League and the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union in issued the following Joint Statement:

  • We share a profound respect for all religions. We are united in our belief in the fundamental importance of religious freedom and tolerance. We condemn any advocacy of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to hostility and violence. While fully recognizing freedom of expression, we believe in the importance of respecting all prophets, regardless of which religion they belong to.
  • The anguish of Muslims at the production of the film insulting Islam, posting of its trailer on the internet and other similar acts, is shared by all individuals and communities who refuse to allow religion to be used to fuel provocation, confrontation and extremism.
  • We condemn any message of hatred and intolerance.
  • We know that the behaviour of small groups of people does not speak for the larger communities from which they hail; but the damage they can inflict can be considerable. We must ensure that the recent events do not undermine the relationships of trust and respect we have built up over so many years among our peoples, communities and states.  The international community cannot be held hostage to the acts of extremists on either side.
  • We condemn the recent attacks on diplomatic missions resulting in tragic loss of lives. Violence can have no place in our societies and offensive speech cannot be met with violent acts as it will only create a spiral of brutality from which we will all suffer. Reason rather than rage must prevail. So today we call for an end to violence wherever it has appeared.  We call for peace and restraint.
  • We reiterate our strong commitment to take further measures and to work for an international consensus on tolerance and full respect of religion, including on the basis of UN Human Rights Council resolution 16/18.  We further call on all leaders, whether they be political, secular or religious, to promote dialogue and mutual understanding.  And we will continue our efforts to show that what joins us together across regions and religions is far greater than what separates us.
  • The only answer to the darkness of intolerance and ignorance is the light of mutual respect, tolerance and dialogue.


In comparison to the Council of Europe statement, which some might criticize for its Eurocentricity, the quadripartite Joint Statement is necessarily more inclusive; but in being so it has had to be careful in its choice of words in order to avoid further offence.  This is particularly evident in the phrase ‘the importance of respecting all prophets, regardless of which religion they belong to’ since, as some commentators have noted, agreement on the respect of deities or divinities, (rather than prophets), would have been problematic to some of the signatories.

Whilst the term ‘profound respect for all religions’ appears open-ended, within the Church of England an existing policy document provides some guidance on the recommended level of engagement for a wide range of religions and related bodies.  Drawn up in June 2009, The Church of England in relation to New Religious Movements and Alternative Spiritualties distinguishes between ‘historic World Religions’, ‘New Religious Movements’ and ‘Alternative Spiritualities’, for which it ‘encourages openness, welcome and hospitality towards people of other faiths and none’.


In a move prompted by the video as well as by Pussy Riot’s brief performance in Moscow, Russia Today reports that Russian Lower House has initiated a proposal to ‘outlaw insults to religions’.  The Pussy Riot performance was followed by ‘the desecration of icons, Nazi and Satanist graffiti painted on churches and synagogues and the assassination of two Muslim clerics in Russia’s internal republics of Tatarstan and Dagestan’.  The article notes that at least two churches were destroyed in the Russian Federation in 2012, and particularly worrying was the campaign of cross-cutting with ‘bounty lists published on the internet for various acts of sacrilege.’

A special address ‘On protection of the religious feelings of the citizens of Russia’, submitted jointly by all four parliamentary parties, was approved by the State Duma, the Deputy Chair stating that this was necessary to institute specific punishments for insulting believers on the internet, especially on blogs and social networks.  Russian legislation currently includes criminal offences relating to: vandalism; the defiling of graves; and inflicting damage to cultural objects to be criminal offences, and the proposed administrative offences for insulting believers’ feelings would introduce fines of 100,000 to 200,000 roubles [€2,481 to €4,962].

However, such a move is not universally welcomed in Russia and some have suggested it emphasizes the closeness of the Orthodox Church to the State – an issue highlighted by Pussy Riot.

Can a religious group discriminate when hiring its premises?

On 26 September the Daily Telegraph reported that St Edmund’s Roman Catholic Church in Southampton had cancelled a booking for yoga classes in its church hall on the grounds that yoga was a Hindu religious activity. The local priest, Fr John Chandler, said that the hall had to be used for Roman Catholic activities and he had banned the class because it was advertised as for ”spiritual yoga”. His argument was that yoga was a Hindu spiritual exercise and that to have allowed the classes to proceed would have meant that a different religious practice would have been taking place in a Roman Catholic church. A spokesman for the Roman Catholic Diocese of Portsmouth told the Telegraph that

“It’s not possible for Catholic premises to be used for non-Christian activities and there is a dilemma with yoga as it can be seen as Hindu meditation or as relaxation. There is no national policy on this and the decision is for each priest.”

The extent to which one can refuse to let religious premises to users of a different denomination or faith is a fairly knotty problem which the Digitalnun has discussed at some length  – nor is it a problem peculiarly for Roman Catholics. The Model Trust Deeds set out in The Constitutional  Practice and  Discipline of  the Methodist  Church, for example, provide what would appear to be only a fairly limited authority for non-Methodist worship in Methodist churches, presumably in the context of Local Ecumenical Partnerships:

14 Religious worship. (1) The managing trustees shall permit such services and meetings for religious worship to be held in any place of worship at such times in such manner and to be officiated at by such presbyter or such other person as shall be required or permitted by Methodist practice and by the provisions of this paragraph.

(2) Notwithstanding that any of the members of any communion or body hereinafter mentioned may not subscribe to the doctrinal standards, the managing trustees may with the consent of such person or persons as the Conference may by Standing Order prescribe –

(a) hold, and permit the participation by members of the Church together with any members of any other Christian communion or body in, any occasional joint service or meeting in a place of worship or on any other premises comprised in the property;

(b) permit any member of any such communion or body to officiate and to preach at any such joint service or meeting.”

Similarly, as my co-blogger David Pocklington notes in a comment on the iBenedictines blog, the Church of England has guidelines about dialogue with other faiths and “new religious movements” which include guidance on “what to do if a group wants to use your church or church hall”. It poses the question:

“Exactly what will the group be doing in the church or church hall? For example, if it is a ‘yoga’ group, is it just an exercise class or are aspects of spiritual teaching involved? Sometimes people have gone along to exercise or therapy groups in church premises only to find they are asked to do something which conflicts, or is incompatible with, their Christian faith”.

The Equality and Human Rights Commission points out in its guidance on Exceptions: charities and religion or belief organisations (published by the EHRC as commentary on the Equality Act 2010) that religious acts of worship are not covered by equality law at all – and presumably the question as to whether or not a yoga session is a meeting in some sense “for religious worship” must therefore be a matter for the judgment of the responsible persons – the trustees, or the incumbent – in the individual case.

Presumably, also, whether or not a religious organisation A can refuse to let its premises to another religious organisation B for purposes other than religious worship (however defined) and do so within the law depends at least in part on the basis of any other letting agreements that organisation A may have previously concluded.

The EHRC Guidance states that:

“Religion or belief organisations can, in certain circumstances, discriminate because of some protected characteristics in the way they operate. Unlike charities, they do not need a charitable instrument or to meet particular tests to be able to restrict their services.

In some situations, religion or belief organisations and people acting on their authority can restrict or refuse:

  • membership of the organisation
  • participation in its activities
  • the use of any goods, facilities or services that it provides, and
  • the use of its premises

because of a person’s religion or belief or their sexual orientation”.


“In relation to a service user’s (or would-be service user’s) religion or belief, the exception only applies where a restriction is necessary:

  • to comply with the purpose of the religion or belief organisation, or
  • to avoid causing offence to members of the religion or belief that the organisation represents.

For example, if either of these conditions is met, a religion or belief organisation can ask people to sign up to a statement of beliefs in order to become a member.

Or it could say that no activities related to other religions or beliefs should take place in the building it uses (provided it does not normally hire out its premises for payment, in which case it could not discriminate)” [emphasis added].

Comment: The last point is crucial: what the Commission seems to be saying is that if a Christian church refused to accommodate (say) a Buddhist meditation group on grounds of doctrinal incompatibility, it could only do so if it extended hospitality to external users generally either gratis or for only a nominal payment – unless it could argue successfully that Buddhist meditation was “worship” and therefore outside the scope of the 2010 Act altogether. In the Commission’s view, however, as a matter of principle a church that hires out its premises commercially is obliged to accept all-comers, like it or not.

So far as we are aware, this point has not yet been tested in the courts – but if it were, the outcome would be by no means a foregone conclusion.

Cite this article as: Frank Cranmer, "Can a religious group discriminate when hiring its premises?" in Law & Religion UK, 29 September 2012,

Self-induced abortion near full term

On 17 September a woman who had aborted her own baby in the final phase of her pregnancy was jailed for eight years. Sarah Catt had earlier pleaded guilty at Leeds Crown Court to administering a poison with intent to procure a miscarriage. She had taken an abortifacient when she was near or at full term, 39 weeks pregnant, to induce an early delivery. She had then claimed that the baby, a boy, had been stillborn and that she had buried his body.

The court was told that Mrs Catt had given up a child for adoption in 1999, had a termination with the agreement of her husband and had tried to terminate another pregnancy but missed the legal limit and had concealed another pregnancy from her husband before the child’s birth.

In his sentencing remarks the trial judge, Cooke J, gave Mrs Catt a one-third reduction in her sentence for having entered a guilty plea at an early stage, however, he told her that:

“You do not suffer from any mental disorder of any kind, as appears from the 27 page psychiatric report that I have read. I see no need for a report from a psychologist. This was a cold calculated decision that you took for your own convenience and in your own self-interest alone” (para 7).

Though he conceded that she was a good parent to her two children (para 14), he concluded that there was “no real mitigation”, that her actions had been somewhere between manslaughter and murder and that

“… a substantial period of imprisonment is required, regardless of  the effect on your family which I know will be considerable” (para 17).

Comment: The case has been the subject of considerable discussion, beginning with an even-handed analysis by Obiter J, who suggests that

“… in the absence of Catt suffering a mental illness, the learned judge appears to have been constrained by the statutory sentencing framework to a substantial sentence of imprisonment certainly in excess of 12 months.  Whether a starting point of 12 years is right is, of course, another matter. and may yet fall to be addressed in the Court of Appeal.”

Amanda Bancroft argues in The Guardian that, whatever the seriousness of the offence, twelve years reduced to eight for an early plea is “a hefty sentence” for any offence. Moreover, Mrs Catt’s

“… history of late-stage abortion, adoption and of live births from pregnancies kept secret until as late as possible, are suggestive of someone with – an understatement, this – some issues around pregnancy”.

Elizabeth Prochaska, also in The Guardian, concedes that the facts in this case were extreme, but argues nevertheless that

“… before prosecuting women for abortion and passing lengthy jail terms, we should ask whether our laws are coherent and, indeed, whether criminalisation is ever appropriate”.

Barbara Hewson, of Hardwicke Chambers, goes so far as to suggest that the charge under section 58 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 was misconceived. That section provides that

“Every woman, being with child, who, with intent to procure her own miscarriage, shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent, … shall be guilty of felony” [emphasis added].

But, writes Hewson, a miscarriage is commonly understood to mean the loss of a pregnancy before foetal viability – which this was not – and there is no law prohibiting a woman from giving birth at home unattended. Moreover, the labour-inducing drug which Mrs Catt took, misoprostol, is commonly prescribed to induce labour and is not, therefore, a “poison or other noxious thing”. There was therefore a tenable argument that her actions fell outside the scope of the offence with which she was charged.

Perhaps surprisingly, given the publication for which he writes, I find myself largely in agreement with Francis Phillips, in the Catholic Herald, when he suggests that Mrs Catt needs help rather than punishment:

“The judge, Mr Justice Cooke, rightly took her action as a grave offence – but will she be helped by an eight-year prison sentence, leaving her husband to cope with two young children to whom, according to her barrister she was “a supportive and loving mother”? I know it is often hard to distinguish the degree of personal responsibility in seemingly calculated acts … but I honestly think that any woman with this long, unhappy and bizarre history of secretive pregnancies and abortions is in need of psychiatric help more than punishment.”

How, I wonder, do judges calculate the correct term of imprisonment in such cases anyway? Is eight years much more of a deterrent than seven – or, indeed, much more of a deterrent than six months? Is a woman intent on an illegal abortion likely to be deterred from that course in any event? And, worst of all to my mind, what about the children?

There are clearly offences, such as premeditated murder in cold blood, for which imprisonment can be the only proper punishment – even if it means rendering a young child, in effect, motherless. But is this particular case one of them?

‘Pay, Pray and Obey’ meets Church and State: the church tax and the German courts

Doe notes that existence of a ‘church tax’ has ‘a profound effect on the classical understanding that there are three models of religion-state relations in Europe’, (N Doe, Law and Religion in Europe, (2011, OUP) at 164 and 177). The tax is a feature of several jurisdictions: Germany, Austria, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Poland and some of the cantons of Switzerland. It was also levied in Sweden prior to the disestablishment of the national Church – but it was then converted into a church fee which the tax authorities now collect from the Church’s members on its behalf.

In Germany, the tax – Kirchensteuer – is payable by those members of the various Churches who pay income tax. However, more citizens are simply opting out of the Churches by the formal legal process of renunciation of membership – Kirchenaustritt – and an ageing population and high levels of unemployment have reduced the number of income-tax payers. The result is that in 2004 only about 35 per cent of the population was paying the tax (see CR Barker ‘Church and State: Lessons from Germany’ (2004) Political Quarterly 168–176) and the percentage in 2012 is probably even lower.

For Roman Catholics in Germany the tax has also created tensions between canon and civil law following the decree of the bishops that those who opt out of paying it should not be given the sacraments or church burials. Some have questioned how such an opt-out is likely to endanger one’s immortal soul. Others have questioned whether Benedict XVI’s statement on ‘Entweltlichung der Kirche’ (the Church’s detachment from the world), made on his four-day State visit to Germany in 2011, was “to encourage German bishops to renounce all earthly aspects of the Church, starting with the Kirchensteuer”.


Today the Federal Administrative Court in Leipzig considered the case of retired canon law professor Hartmut Zapp, who had filed case against the German Church based upon doctrinal issues that it was a person’s belief that determined membership of the Catholic Church rather than any financial relationship.  The lower courts had issued contradictory rulings, but reports suggest that the Federal Court ruled that from the state’s point of view, (i.e. in relation to the tax rather than to doctrinal matters), those who left the Church voluntarily were not regarded as members of the Church.

The English civil courts avoid consideration of doctrinal matters, and from the reports currently available, it appears that the Leipzig court has adopted a similar approach.  Whilst the verdict will be welcomed by the Church with regard to the potential loss in revenue, this victory might be short-lived if Catholics, who are disenchanted with the performance of the Church with regard to child abuse and other issues, disregard the bishops’ threatened sanctions and opt out of paying the Kirchensteuer. 

At their autumn plenary meeting in Fulda, which coincided with the court hearing, the bishops defended the exclusion of those who stopped paying tax.  A report in the Catholic Herald indicates that the bishops’ decree states:

‘departing Catholics could no longer receive the sacraments of penance, Holy Communion, Confirmation or anointing of the sick, other than when facing death, or exercise any Church function, including belonging to parish councils or acting as godparents.

Marriages would be granted only by a bishop’s consent and unrepentant Catholics would not be given Church funerals, the decree said’.

The decree is said to have been approved in August by the Vatican’s Congregation for Bishops, and parish priests would be asked to write to departing Catholics, inviting them to meet and explain their decision and have the consequences explained.  This suggests that the sanctions are ferendae sententiae (“sentence to be passed”) rather than latae sententiae (automatic), but their basis within the Church’s 1983 Code of Canon Law is as yet unreported.

Further updates and analysis will be posted as additional information becomes available.

Aspects of religious persecution

On the day following the hearing of the UK cases of McFarlane, Ladele , Eweida and Chaplin by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, (ECtHR), the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg, (CJEU), delivered its judgement in Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Y & Z  [2012] EUECJ C-71/11. The cases before the ECtHR concerned the complaints of four practising Christians that UK law did not sufficiently protect their rights to freedom of religion and freedom from discrimination at work. The CJEU judgement related to the refusal of the German administrative court to grant asylum to two Pakistani nationals who claimed that if returned to their native country, as Ahmadi Muslims they would be subject to criminal sanctions under the Pakistani Penal Code.

The juxtaposition of these cases invites comparison, and commentators have suggested that, apart from degree of severity of the persecution, the Eweida and Chaplin situations were not fundamentally different from that of religious minorities in Muslim countries, here; and that the CJEU ruling on the manifestation of a person’s religion in public is contrary to the view of the UK Government and courts that religious practice is entirely private, here

Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Y & Z

The UK cases  have been address on this web log here, here, here and hereThey are primarily based upon on Articles 9 (freedom of religion) and 14 (prohibition of discrimination) of the European Convention on Human Rights, and all four applicants complain that domestic law failed adequately to protect their right to manifest their religion.

By contrast, in Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Y & Z the applicants claim that the action by the German authorities was contrary to Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted. In addition, the Court considered the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), the relevant rights  of which relate back to the European Convention on Human Rights.

The CJEU summarized the questions raised by the Federal Administrative Court [Bundesverwaltungsgericht] as:

  • whether Article 9(1)(a) of the Directive is to be interpreted as meaning that any interference with the right to religious freedom that infringes Article 10(1) of the Charter may constitute an ‘act of persecution’ within the meaning of that provision of the Directive, and whether a distinction must be made between the ‘core areas’ of religious freedom and its external manifestation; and
  • whether Article 2(c) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that the applicant’s fear of being persecuted is well-founded where such a person can avoid exposure to persecution in his country of origin by abstaining from certain religious practices.

The relevant parts of the judgement are contained in paragraph 72, in which it is argued that Article 9(1)(a) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that:

  • not all interference with the right to freedom of religion which infringes Article 10(1) of the [EU] Charter is capable of constituting an ‘act of persecution’ within the meaning of that provision of the Directive;
  • there may be an act of persecution as a result of interference with the external manifestation of that freedom, and
  • for the purpose of determining whether interference with the right to freedom of religion which infringes Article 10(1) of the Charter may constitute an ‘act of persecution’, the competent authorities must ascertain, in the light of the personal circumstances of the person concerned, whether that person, as a result of exercising that freedom in his country of origin, runs a genuine risk of, inter alia, being prosecuted or subject to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by one of the actors referred to in Article 6 of the Directive.

and in paragraph 79:

  •  “… where it is established that, upon his return to his country of origin, the person concerned will follow a religious practice which will expose him to a real risk of persecution, he should be granted refugee status, in accordance with Article 13 of the Directive. The fact that he could avoid that risk by abstaining from certain religious practices is, in principle, irrelevant.”

A fuller analysis of the case is posted on the UK Immigration Law blog.


Although reference to the European Convention on Human Rights is common to both considerations, the level of read-across from the CJEU judgement is limited.  Whilst the CJEU considered that the difference between public and private manifestation of religion was irrelevant, this was conditional on the exposure to a ‘real risk of persecution’, and in the context of Directive 2004/83/EC, not all interference with the right to freedom of religion constituted an ‘act of persecution’ within the meaning of the relevant provision of the Directive.

Thus ‘the degree of severity of persecution’ is fundamental to the CJEU’s reasoning, not merely a factor distinguishing between the considerations of the two tribunals, and in itself would be difficult to apply to the UK situation. However, in relation to the public/private manifestation debate, the above commentators cited judgements of the Supreme Court: HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31 ; and RT (Zimbabwe) & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38.

In HJ (Iran), the Supreme Court held that the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal was wrong to reject the appeal by the second appellant, HT on the basis that he could relocate to a different part of Cameroon and (presumably) act discreetly there in relation to his homosexuality. At paragraph 78, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry summarised the issue as follows :

“In short, what is protected is the applicant’s right to live freely and openly as a gay man. That involves a wide spectrum of conduct, going well beyond conduct designed to attract sexual partners and maintain relationships with them … In other words, gay men are to be as free as their straight equivalents in the society concerned to live their lives in the way that is natural to them as gay men, without the fear of persecution.”

The emergence and recognition of the principle established in HJ (Iran) was cited with approval in the Scottish case Opinion of Lord Stewart in the Petition of A H C (AP) for a Judicial Review [2012] CSOH 147.  In considering the risk of Article 3 ECHR violations in relation to the removal to Pakistan of Christian converts who would be considered apostates in the eyes of their former Muslim co-religionists, Lord Stewart stated [Paragraph 46]:

“I therefore start from the proposition that if a proper respect for human rights entails that individuals should be entitled to live out their sexuality openly, they should be as much entitled to live out their religious faith; and that no one should be expected to veil his or her faith from a motive of self-protection.”

In RT, the court held that refusal of refugee status should not be countenanced where it would be necessary for a person to engage in dissimulation about his or her political beliefs in order to avoid persecution by the Mugabe regime – which expects fulsome protestations of loyalty at every turn. Said Lord Dyson at paragraph 42:

“[T]he right not to hold the protected beliefs is a fundamental right which is recognised in international and human rights law and, for the reasons that I have given, the Convention too. There is nothing marginal about it. Nobody should be forced to have or express a political opinion in which he does not believe. He should not be required to dissemble on pain of persecution. Refugee law does not require a person to express false support for an oppressive regime, any more than it requires an agnostic to pretend to be a religious believer in order to avoid persecution. A focus on how important the right not to hold a political or religious belief is to the applicant is wrong in principle”.

Whilst the principle associated with the public manifestation of one’s beliefs is relative straightforward to state, the associated legislation is complex.

In relation to the Church of England, an earlier post reported that in July this year, the General Synod voted by a substantial majority for a motion on the Manifestation of Faith in Public Life:

“That this Synod: (a) express its conviction that it is the calling of Christians to order and govern our lives in accordance with the teaching of Holy Scripture, and to manifest our faith in public life as well as in private, giving expression to our beliefs in the written and spoken word, and in practical acts of service to the local community and to the nation; and b) request the Archbishops’ Council to introduce draft legislation to embody this conviction in the Canons of the Church of England”.

As indicated in the earlier post, the task of the Archbishops’ Council in drafting the new Canon is one thing, the extent to which this is taken into consideration by the civil courts is another.

Christians, crosses, Eweida & Co – and the stool of repentance

The following exchange took place during Commons questions to the Ministry of Justice on Tuesday 18 September:

Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP): The recent decision by the European Court of Human Rights ruled against Christians who were penalised for wearing a cross at work or taking a stand for their religious beliefs. That has caused great concern, and many people are asking where is the protection and religious freedom for Christians. What steps will be taken to prevent the erosion of justice for those with Christian beliefs, and to provide people with the protection that they should—and must—have?

Damian Green (Minister of State for Police and Criminal Justice): The Government support people’s right to wear a cross, and the law requires employers to consider whether any provisions or criteria that they adopt would disadvantage employees of any religion. We have discussed court actions in a previous Question Time, and common sense is important on behalf of both courts and employers, so as to allow the legitimate expression of religious views in the workplace.” [HC Deb 18 September cc 781–782: emphasis added]

The merest soupçon of common sense wouldn’t do some MPs any harm either. So the ECtHR has “ruled against Christians”, has it? So when did that happen? Has he seen a bootlegged copy of a very early draft judgment on Eweida & Co? And if he has, can anyone tell me where I can get one?

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  • non-textual material appearing on Law and Religion UK is subject to the same conditions of copyright as other textual material; this extends to material that is accessible to sources such as Google Images that has been extracted from Law and Religion UK without explicit or implicit authorization.

July 2015